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Not a Normal Country
Italy and its Party Systems
MARCO VALBRUZZI
There is a country in Europe with political parties and party systems that are 
younger than the electorate; in which technocratic governments are seen as solutions 
rather than as signs of a failing democratic regime; and where a consolidated party 
system was able to crumble away in less than a year. There is a country in Europe in 
which a tycoon magnate participated in six electoral contests for the premiership, 
became President of Council three times, and was only obliged to abandon his 
parliamentary seat after a definitive conviction for tax-fraud. There is a country in 
Europe in which leaders of left-wing parties have never been able to attain (in the 
elections) the premiership and where an institutional transition that began in the 
early 1990s is still underway. The list goes on, but the name of this countryought to 
be clear: Italy.
This article is devoted to the analysis of the unusual trajectory of Italian parties 
and party systems from the end of World War II to the 2013 general election, when 
an oversized coalition of three parties, with the crucial support of the President of 
the Republic, formed a so-called ”broad agreements” government (governo di larghe 
intese) under the guidance of Enrico Letta1. This article will not repeat the clichéd 
story of the passage from the First to an alleged Second Republic, for the simple fact 
that this transition never actually took place. Yes Italy changed the format and, above 
all, the mechanics of its party system in the mid-1990s, but it has never significantly 
changed the Constitution and the functioning of its main political institutions. If the 
label ”Second Republic” is designed to describe the transition from a constitutional 
structure to something else, that ”Second” republic never existed. This article will 
not only describe the history of this ”phantom” republic, but it will also analyze with 
more rigorous analytical and historical frameworks and concepts the evolution (or, 
better, devolution) of the Italian party systems. Welcome on board.
Re-inventing (A) Democracy
In the beginning was the Constitution. After twenty years of Fascist regime 
and the ultimate fall of the puppet Republic of Salò (formed in 1943 by the last 
defenders of the crumbling dictatorship), Italy began to move towards a (new) form 
of democratic institutional setting. This crucial passage was formally certified, in 
1946, by the election of a Constituent Assembly endowed with the prerogative to 
write a new Consti tution. Inevitably, the memory of the recent authoritarian past was 
difficult to cancel; the ”complex of the tyrant”, the fear of a return to dictatorship, 
1 Gianfranco PASQUINO, Marco VALBRUZZI, ”Post-electoral Politics in Italy. Institutional 
Problems and Political Perspectives”, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. XVIII, no. 4, 2013, 
pp. 466-484.
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was the main inspiration of the Constitution makers. In the shadow of this difficult 
past, the Italian Constitution established in its second part – dedicated to the new 
institutional structure of the state – a weak head of cabinet, prisoner of the newly 
formed mass-based parties and of an almighty Parliament. Within such an institutional 
setting, the (role of the) President of the Council was little more than a primus inter 
pares – obliged to negotiate each and every policy or decision with his ministers, his 
allied parties, and the factions within his own party. The electoral system used both 
for the election of the Constituent Assembly and, later, the Parliament until the early 
1990s was consistent, on the one hand, with the institutional design recently approved 
by the Constitution-makers and, on the other, with the international context brought 
about by the Cold War. In fact, the proportional electoral system based on open party-
lists had the advantage of decreasing the confrontation between those political actors in 
defence of/committed to the ”system” (i.e., the Western liberal democracy plus a market 
economy) and the so-called anti-system camp, namely those (especially Communists) 
more or less strictly tied to the Soviet Union. Moreover, proportional representation 
was particularly agreeable to the balance of political powers that emerged after the end 
of the World War II. The 1946 elections clearly established the greater electoral strength 
of three parties: the Christian Democracy (DC), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), 
and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). Revolving around these three giants, and as I will 
discuss later, in particular around the Christian Democrats, were other small satellite 
parties: the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Italian Republican Party (PRI) (in a sense, the 
poor heirs of the old Liberal state Mussolini’s authoritarian regime had obliterated), 
the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI, as of 1947) and, finally, a neo-fascist party 
called the Italian Social Movement (MSI). This was the ”format” of the party system 
that existed immediately after the approval of the new Constitution and was promptly 
crystallized by the very founding elections of April 1948: seven ”relevant” parties – in 
Sartori’s terms1 – spread across an ”over stretched” left-right political spectrum. This 
was the launching pad of what we shall describe as the ”first party system” in Italy.
The First Party System of the Italian Republic
From 1945 to 1947 Italy was governed by oversized coalition cabinets encom-
passing the political parties that had contributed to the fall of the Fascist regime. As 
we have seen above, the Italian Constitution was the result of, or more accurately, the 
happy compromise between the partners of this ”long-lived” anti-Fascist coalition, 
namely the Communists, Socialists and Christian Democrats. With the approval of the 
Constitution in December 1947 and the emergence of a clear international bipolarism 
(the democratic Western bloc vs. the Communist bloc) the incentives for maintaining 
a (quasi) all-encompassing coalition were dwindling. In fact, the April 1948 general 
election brought about the breakdown of the anti-Fascist coalition and the emergence 
of a different political and cultural divide: the defenders of liberal democracy versus 
the supporters of the Communist Empire, on either side of the iron curtain. And 
this was the profound schism that would divide Italian parties and voters for the 
following five decades.
1 Giovanni SARTORI, Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1976.
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This ”Great Divide” in the history of Italy, as Cotta and Verzichelli1 have 
described it, had two immediate consequences for the Italian party system, both of 
which are inevitably linked to the domestic repercussions of the international conflict. 
First, the bipolarism at the international level transferred to the domestic level, albeit 
solely at the electoral level. In some respects, as discussed later, the DC and PCI were 
strengthened simply by virtue of their roles as the political ambassadors of the US 
and the URSS (respectively). The political identities of the two parties were moulded 
by the fact that they ”belonged” to, or orbited around, one of the blocs at the upper, 
international level. This strict association was both a factor of their success as well as 
an obstacle to any kind of future transformation; both in terms of individual parties 
and for the overall functioning of the party system. 
In sum, thanks to their more or less explicit connections with the two international 
blocs created by the international politics, the DC and the PCI very quickly became the 
main pillars of the party system. And it is from this particular viewpoint, that needs 
to be adequately specified and circumscribed, that Giorgio Galli described the Italian 
party system as a case of ”imperfect two-party system”2; where one pole is obliged to 
govern and the other’s role is to criticize and observe those in power. Consequently, 
alternation in Italy’s government was impossible – both as an expectation and an 
empirical phenomenon. It was this missing element that became the flaw or ”imper-
fection” of Italian-style two-party system. Thus the balance of power operating at the 
international level was recreated, ceteris paribus, at the national level: two main poles 
orbited by a number of minor satellites.
However, the ”imperfect two-party system” model, whilst useful when 
describing the balance of power in the electoral arena (the relative strength of the DC 
and PCI), was inadequate for the description and explanation of the party system 
at parliamentary and governmental levels. And it is at this point that another more 
relevant and well-designed analytical framework enters the scene.
The premise is that the second domestic consequence of international bipolarism 
for the Italian party system was the creation of a divide between pro-system actors, 
namely, those in favour of the Western brand of democracy, and the anti-system actors, 
that is, those forces that were in sharp contrast with the ideals of a liberal democratic 
regime. This kind of cleavage, which was not unprecedented in Italian history, created 
the conditions for the emergence of the kind of party system Giovanni Sartori termed 
”polarized pluralism”3 and which characterized Italy’s political landscape until the 
early 1990s. First, the expression ”polarized pluralism” is a synthesis of two distinct 
attributes of the system: its ”format” (number of relevant political parties) and its 
”mechanics” (how and where the parties compete). As to the former, the Italian example 
must be included in the class of ”extreme multipartism” – those party systems with 
more than five ”relevant” parties. With regard to the mechanics of the system, Italy was 
a preeminent example of ”polarized multipartism”, in which the ideological distance 
between the extreme parties is large and significant. By putting these two attributes 
together, we obtain the type of party system known as ”polarized pluralism”, the 
1 Maurizio COTTA, Luca VERZICHELLI, ”Italy. From ʼConstrained’ Coalitions to Alter-
nating Governments?”, in Wolfgang C. MÜLLER, Kaare STRØM (eds.), Coalition Governments 
in Western Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York, 2000, p. 435.
2 Giorgio GALLI, Il bipartitismo imperfetto. Comunisti e democristiani in Italia, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 1966.
3 Giovanni SARTORI, Parties and Party Systems…cit.
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defining characteristics of which are: 1) the presence of relevant anti-system parties; 
2) the existence of bilateral oppositions; 3) the occupation of the metrical centre of the 
system by one party or a group of parties; 4) the congenital ideological patterning 
of the polity; 5) inter-party competition driven by centrifugal forces; 6) significant 
ideological distance between the extreme poles; and 7) the presence of irresponsible 
oppositions which 8) practice the politics of outbidding or over-promising. Needless 
to say, all eight attributes were present in the Italian political landscape at the end of 
WWII. If an anti-system party is, in Sartori’s own words, a party that ”undermines the 
legitimacy of the regime it opposes”1, then there is no doubt that both the Communists 
and the neo-Fascists, staunch critics of liberal democracy, would have changed/
destroyed the system (given enough power). The anti-system nature of these two 
parties, located at the extreme poles of the ideological (left-right) spectrum, brought 
about the emergence of a two-fold (i.e., bilateral) opposition against the party that 
permanently occupied the centre of the party system, namely, the Christian Demo-
cracy. As a consequence of this specific configuration of the system, inter-party 
competition was driven by centrifugal forces whose main consequences were, on the 
one hand, the progressive undermining of the centre pro-system parties, and, on the 
other, the intensification of the so-called ”politics of outbidding”. In practice, since 
the anti-system parties were always defined by their oppositional role, they had no 
incentives, either electorally or institutionally, to behave responsibly. In sum, all of 
the above features created a multiparty system marked by a high level of ideological 
fever, a pathological level of governmental instability and, (not so) paradoxically, an 
immutable political landscape. Briefly put, governmental instability went hand in 
hand, and quite happily so, with political immobilism. 
As Table 1 (see the Annex) shows, the long cycle of the first party system, in 
which the only stable element was the instability of the innumerable coalition 
cabinets, can be subdivided into four shorter sub-phases, each characterized by 
different governing formulae. During the ”centrist coalition” (centrismo), lasting from 
1948 to 1960, the Christian Democrats were the cornerstone of a coalitional formula 
that included three smaller parties: the PSDI, PRI and PLI. At the end of this first sub-
phase, and especially with the failed attempt to set up a high majority electoral bonus 
in 1953 (with the so-called Legge truffa, or the ”swindle law”) in order to strengthen 
the position of the largest party in Parliament, the second coalitional formula entailed 
a gradual inclusion – starting at the local level – of the PSI within the ”governmental 
field”. This strategy, better known as the ”opening to the left”, aimed at enlarging and 
consolidating the group of parties committed to the democratic system. Consequently, 
the Socialists abandoned their ”semi-responsible” attitude to the party system and 
gradually moved into the area of the governing-oriented parties2; at the same time, 
the ”centre-left” coalition (PSI, PSDI, DC and PRI) tried (with only limited success) 
to join the modernization process that began in Italy during the mid-1950s. Besides 
some important economic and social reforms, this second coalitional formula failed in 
front of the explosion of mass protests, social unrest and the menace of terrorism that 
struck Italy in the late 1960s. The so-called period of ”national solidarity” – namely, 
the third coalitional formula that entailed an understated alliance between the DC 
1 Ibidem, p. 117, italics in the original.
2 Giovanni SARTORI, Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1982.
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and the Communists headed by Enrico Berlinguer – was the belated and mostly failed 
attempt to face the political and economic upheavals of the 1970s.
The failure of that ”historic compromise” proved, once again, that Italy was 
and remained a ”difficult democracy”, incapable of bearing the weight of wholesale 
turnover in government, but also that the parties and their leading representatives 
were unable to kick start a party system that had lost – to use Berlinguer’s famous 
expression– its ”forward thrust” (spinta propulsiva). The five-party coalition formula 
(pentapartito) of 1980-1992 represented the last attempt to defend a ruling class that 
was older, even more self-referential, and unable to understand the wants and needs 
of a society undergoing swift and profound transformation. The best indicator of 
that dismal state of affairs is perfectly represented by the unhappy demise of the 
pentapartito: not only did it end in disgrace but its members were also swept away in 
the deluge1. As a consequence, the crisis of a specific coalitional formula turned out to 
be a systemic crisis, that is, the crisis of a system unable to change its cabinets/players 
without changing the rules of the game. In 1992, the first party system had reached 
the end of the line. And, as we shall see in the next section, while the old system was 
dying, a new system was undergoing a traumatic genesis.
When and How the Transition Took Off
Pundits and scholars, and historians in particular, are accustomed to dividing the 
Italian republican history into two distinct periods: the First and the Second Republic2. 
Although the cut-off point between the two republics has not been clearly identified, it is 
traditionally ascribed to the early 1990s, the period following the pentapartito phase and 
before the 1994 general election. It was during that transitional period that something 
died and something else was born. Nevertheless, the main point to stress here concerns 
the validity of that separation and, in particular, its ”constitutional character”. The 
somewhat simplistic idea of a so-called Second Republic implies a constitutional break, i.e. 
the suppression of the old Constitution and the creation of a (mostly) new constitutional 
structure. As convenient this would be, it is simply not what happened in Italy and 
I reject strongly the overstated and fictitious distinction between these two alleged 
republics. That said, and not only for the sake of truth but also for the validity of our 
subsequent analyses, what happened in the early 1990s should not be underestimated. 
Yet, unless were construct the entire chain of events that led to the collapse of the first 
party system, that risk of underestimation cannot be avoided.
So, let us start from the beginning of the deflagration and look for the spark that 
started the fire. Since the party system was so intimately linked to the international 
context, the status quo could be modified only through a more or less profound 
revolution at the supranational level. The possibility for that kind of change arrived 
in November 1989 when the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled not only the end of a 
1 Luciano CAFAGNA, La grande slavina. L’Italia verso la crisi della democrazia, Marsilio, 
Padova, 1993.
2 Simona COLARIZI, Biografia della Prima Repubblica, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 1996; Giuseppe 
MAMMARELLA, L’Italia di oggi. Storia e cronaca di un ventennio 1992-2012, Il Mulino, Bologna, 
2012; Simona COLARIZI, Marco GERVASONI, La tela di Penelope. Storia della Seconda Repubblica, 
Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2012.
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specific ideology but also the breakdown of legitimacy of many Communist (and 
anti-Communist) parties across Europe. Naturally, for the country with the strongest 
Communist Party in Western Europe this was even more relevant1. Put frankly, the 
end of the Cold War implicitly meant the history of a party came to an end; within a 
few years the PCI changed its name and logo, rejecting its past, and yet it maintained 
almost entirely its leadership2. If the transformation of the PCI into the PDS (Partito 
della Sinistra, Democratic Party of the Left) was the direct consequence of the end of 
the Cold War, the indirect effects must be detected among the governing parties and, 
in particular, in the functioning of the party system. The ”Great Divide” that had 
characterized Italy since the end of WWII was bound to lose its import among the 
ruins of the Berlin Wall. The DC owed its electoral success, and its pivotal position in 
Parliament, to the fact that it was Italy’s main defender against the Communist menace. 
With the demise of that menace, both its ”protectionist” function and ideological 
raison d’être within the system was lost. Within a few years, the DC would also follow 
its main historic opponent tothe graveyard of the old parties. At the systemic level, 
the effect of the disappearance of the ”international bipolarism” brought about, on the 
one hand, the end of the conventio ad excludendum, that is, the constant exclusion of the 
PCI from the government, and, on the other, the ”de-freezing” of that vast share of the 
electorate that had supported the DC or its allied parties3. 
In sum, the fall of the Berlin Wall presented a window of opportunity for all 
those outside or under the control of the system. The judicial power, no longer 
controlled (either directly or indirectly) by a crumbling ruling class, promoted a 
widespread judicial investigation in 1992 (called Mani Pulite, ”Clean Hands”) into 
party corruption that seriously damaged the standing of all the governing parties with 
the(ir) electorate. At the same time, the serious economic downturn in the early 1990s 
and, concurrently, the decision to accept the terms of the Maastricht Treaty presented 
additional challenges to a party system on the verge of a real political disaster. Last 
but not least, the introduction of a new, quasi-majoritarian electoral system, following 
(not accurately) the popular pressure prompted by a specific referendum in 1993, 
changed significantly the rules of the electoral game: one of the main pillars of the 
first party system – the proportional electoral law – was dissolved and substituted by 
a hybrid system where, at the Chamber of Deputies, 75% of the seats were elected in 
single-member districts by a plurality system and the remaining 25% by a proportional 
system with closed party-list.
This combination of political, judicial, and economic factors created a condition 
that can correctly be described as ”collective anxiety”, in which new parties, led by 
more or less charismatic political entrepreneurs, found new pathways to electoral 
success. This was, first, the case with the Northern League, a new macro-regional 
party, created (or more correctly, confederated) thanks to Umberto Bossi with the 
1 Austin RANNEY, Giovanni SARTORI (eds.), Eurocommunism: The Italian Case, AEI-Hoover 
Press, Washington, D.C., 1978.
2 Piero IGNAZI, Dal PCI al PDS, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1992; Gianfranco PASQUINO, 
”Programmatic Renewal, and Much More. From the PCI to the PDS”, West European Politics, 
vol. XVI, no. 1, 1993, pp. 156-173.
3 Leonardo MORLINO, ”Crisis of Parties and Change of Party System in Italy”, Party 
Politics, vol. II, n. 1, 1996, pp. 5-30; Luciano BARDI, ”Party Responses to Electoral Dealignment 
in Italy”, in Peter MAIR, Wolfgang MÜLLER, Fritz PLASSER (eds.), Political Parties and Electoral 
Change, Sage, London, 2004, pp. 111-144.
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ambition of representing all the interests and identities of those living in the Northern 
regions. The second case of entrepreneurial success, politically speaking, was achieved 
by the media-tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. In less than one year he was able to build from 
scratch an entirely new party: Forza Italia (”Go Italy!”). The unexpected arrival (and 
success) of that party was the last, but absolutely significant, indicator of the ongoing 
destructuration of the old party system. Italy was entering the age of ”destructured 
bipolarism”.
Italian Politics between Dealignment and Realignment 
In 1993, for the first time in Italian history the premiership was held by a ”non-
party personality” without any previous party affiliation: Carlo Azeglio Ciampi 
(former governor of the Bank of Italy). With the crucial consensus of the President of 
the Republic, Ciampi headed a transitional cabinet with the objectives of implementing 
the new electoral law, introducing institutional and administrative reforms and 
drafting a budget law. In a country where the Prime Ministers and ministers had 
always been men (though, in a few cases women) affiliated with specific political 
parties, Ciampi’s premiership was a further sign of the decay of the Italian-style 
party government which, in many cases, was transformed into a vicious form of 
partyocracy (partitocrazia)1 – the absolute kratos of the parties over the polis and the 
people. A technocrat-led party government was, however, only the first tremor of 
a much more profound political earthquake that would take place during the 1994 
general election. Though the concept of a ”critical election” is neither universally 
recognized nor precisely conceptualized, few would argue that the 1994 election was 
not, in many respects, ”critical”. In the definition given by V.O. Key, an election is 
critical if ”the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing 
cleavage within the electorate” or, more accurately, ”the realignment made manifest in 
the voting in such elections seems to persist for several succeeding elections”2. In brief, 
critical elections are those in which ”new and durable electoral groupings are formed”. 
In other words, an election can be defined as critical if it brings about an electoral 
realignment that is, in Campbell’s terms, ”a durable and substantial shift in the parties’ 
national electoral balance of power”3. So, now the question is: how many realignments 
can be identified in Italy since 1945? I hasten to say that answering this question is 
important because it can help create a new periodization scheme for the Italian electoral 
history. If indeed, as Campbell notes, a party system defines normal partisan politics, 
then ”realignments are the change from one party system to the next”. 
Returning to the question above: How many electoral realignments can be 
counted in Italy? Here the issue is not what is a realignment, but how do we quantify 
1 Gianfranco PASQUINO, ”Party Government in Italy. Achievements and Prospects”, 
in Richard S. KATZ (ed.), Party Government and its Alternatives, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1987, 
pp. 202-242; Salvatore VASSALLO, Il governo di partito in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1994; Mauro 
CALISE, ”The Italian Particracy: Beyond President and Parliament”, Political Science Quarterly, 
vol. 109, no. 3, 1994, pp. 441-460.
2 V.O. KEY Jr., ”A Theory of Critical Elections”, Journal of Politics, vol. XVII, no. 1, 1955, 
p. 4.
3 James E. CAMPBELL, ”Party Systems and Realignments in the United States, 1868-2004”, 
Social Science History, vol. XXX, no. 3, p. 361.
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a realignment?As Carreras et al. have pointed out, ”stable alignments are relatively 
easy to pin down empirically: they require (a) that most voters choose one of the 
existing parties and (b) that electoral volatility is low”1. But the difficultly begins at the 
next step, when one needs to pin down (empirically) the concept of realignment. If a 
dealignment in the electoral market implies a period of change where the attachment 
of voters to established parties weakens and the support in favor of the mass parties 
dissolve, then the 1994 Italian general election is a good example of that kind of 
electoral change. To further pin down empirically this concept, Carreras et al. offer 
a list of indicators that can (cum grano salis) be used to identify cases of dealignment. 
Among the potential indicators suggested by Carreras et al., I will focus on three 
factors: a) elevated levels of electoral volatility; b) the emergence of new political 
challengers who lack political experience and/or a developed party apparatus; and, 
c) the rise of political outsiders ”in association with new parties that are often nothing 
more than electoral vehicles serving their personal political ambition”2. 
As to the level of electoral volatility, the data in Figure 1 (see the Annex) are self-
evident. The highest levels of volatility are registered in 1994 and, as I will later discuss 
in more detail, in 2013. From 1948 to 1992 the average level of electoral mobility has a 
value of 9.1, and in 1994 it was over four times higher. From this perspective, the rise 
of electoral volatility in Italy during the early 1990s, as a sign of electoral dealignment, 
is undisputable. With the collapse of the traditional political parties, the new and 
emergent electoral offer changed completely the political landscape and, accordingly, 
voters’ behavior. 
The second indicator concerns the vacuum created by the disappearance of the 
main governing-oriented parties at the twilight of the first party system. That vacuum 
did not exist for long; especially on the right side of the political spectrum, both the 
Northern League and Forza Italia strove for the electoral legacy of the old parties. 
Briefly put, new parties under the direction of new political entrepreneurs with little 
or no concrete political experience decided to ”take the field”. And, unexpectedly, 
they won the game. This state of affairs is described well by Figure 2 (see the Annex), 
which shows the average age of the parties in Parliament from 1945 to date. In 1994, 
the average age of the party system was at its lowest: just 2 years old. That means, in 
a nutshell, that the old, mass-based parties, with historic roots and strong linkages 
with society, have been completely eradicated and substituted by new political 
organizations with only feeble and unstable relationships with their fluctuant voters. 
The same holds true with regard to the age of the oldest party. In 1992, the PSI was the 
oldest party in the legislature – having been founded in Genoa exactly one century 
ago; two years later, following the eruption of the corruption scandals (Tangentopoli) 
and the change of the electoral system, the party, along with the other two mass parties 
(DC and PCI), was completely decimated. 
Finally, the third indicator of a critical, de-aligning electoral phase is the rise of 
political outsiders within the vanguard of these wholly new political organizations. 
In this case, the information concerns, above all, the nature of the newly created 
parties at the end of the first party system, that is, their specific organizational model, 
the role of the founder/leader and the relationship between the leadership and the 
1 Miguel CARRERAS, Scott MORGENSTERN, Yen-Pin SU, ”Refining the Theory of 
Partisan Alignments. Evidence from Latin America”, Party Politics, online: July 14, 2013.
2 Ibidem.
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membership (if any). Of course, we cannot dwell on all of these factors here, but suffice 
to say that the period from 1994 onward has been described by many scholars1 as a 
period characterized, if not dominated, by ”personal parties”. These are not simply 
parties with a (easily identifiable) leader; these parties are the longa manus, the direct 
incarnation of the leader. To parody McLuhan, one might even say that in these cases 
the leader (and the message) is the party. And, precisely for this reason, when such 
a leader dies, or retires, or loses his charismatic popularity for whatever reason, the 
party’s fate is sealed. The electoral trajectory of many Italian personal parties – from 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and Antonio Di Pietro’s Italy of Values to the latest (already 
failed) political creation of the former technocrat Prime Minister Mario Monti (Civic 
Choice) – is strictly linked to the personal trajectory of their founding leaders: après 
eux, le déluge (et la débâcle). In such an unstable context, where new parties come and 
go with a frequency unmatched by any other West European democracy, the overall 
level of party system consolidation remains remarkably low.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the legislative election of 1994 was a turning 
point in Italy’s political history. Mass parties disappeared, new personal parties 
entered the scene, anti-system forces became obsolete after the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, and new electoral coalitions were created in response to the incentives of the 
new electoral system. Many other elements can be added to this list but the point 
is clear: in 1994, because of both exogenous and endogenous factors, the old party 
system created in the aftermath of WWII was no longer in place. After a brief and 
quasi-technocratic interlude in 1993, Italy awoke to its second party system. This 
second phase of the Italian Republic is characterized by a wholesale de-freezing of 
the old cleavages. Consequently, the so-called ”freezing hypothesis” stated by Lispet 
and Rokkan2 may be completely rejected and re-written as such: the current party 
system does not reflect the cleavage structure of the 1920s (or 1960s) and the party 
organizations are younger than the majority of the national electorate. 
To recapitulate, extreme fluidity and personalization are the key-words for the 
correct understanding of the Italian second party system. These distinct but convergent 
factors have shaped Italy since 1994, a phase during which electoral volatility has 
always been, on average, higher than during the previous phase. Although the 
mobility of the voters has been higher within the coalitional bloc (either among the 
parties of the centre-right or the centre-left) than between them, high levels of volatility 
suggest the status quo has yet to reach a minimum level of consolidation. Within the 
two different blocs, which have changed configuration and name in almost every 
election, new parties enter and exit, new actors are included and others excluded and, 
as a result, the characteristic instability of the first party system has doubled: now there 
are two unstable and fragmented coalitions, rather than one. In spite of this persistent 
fluidity, the ostensible stability of the party system createdin the mid-1990s was 
1 Mauro CALISE, Il partito personale. I due corpi del leader, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2010; 
Leonardo MORLINO, Marco TARCHI (eds.), Partiti e caso italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2006; 
Duncan McDONNELL, ”Silvio Berlusconi’s Personal Parties: From Forza Italia to the Popolo 
della Libertà”, Political Studies, vol. 61, no. S1, 2013, pp. 217-233; Gianfranco PASQUINO, ”Italy: 
The Triumph of Personalist Parties”, in Tatiana P. KOSTADINOVA, Barry LEVITT (eds.), 
Towards a Theory of Personalistic Parties, forthcoming.
2 Seymour M. LIPSET, Stein ROKKAN, ”Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: An Introduction”, in IDEM (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, Free Press, 
New York, 1967, p. 50.
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mitigated by or, more precisely, encapsulated within, two all-encompassing coalitions 
that regularly alternate in power. Nevertheless, this ”majoritarian miracle”1, in the 
sense that it was the artificial creation of a quasi-majoritarian electoral system, lasted 
for no more than five consecutive elections, when new endogenous and exogenous 
factors paved the way for a new critical election. In fact, the 2013 general election was 
affected significantly by the severe consequences of the so-called ”Great Recession”, 
perhaps the worst economic crisis in the history of the Republic. Although the crisis 
also hit many other European states, its political effects have depended significantly 
on whether a country’s party system has strong roots in society or whether those 
roots had been cynically cultivated by clientelistic relationships between politicians 
and voters. Greece, for instance, is an example of the latter scenario2; Italy might be 
interpreted in the light of both. Be as it may, the Italian second party system did not 
show any degree of resiliency in the face of the economic crisis and, paradoxically, 
its impact was even exacerbated by those same actors that were brought in to save 
Italy from bankruptcy. In fact, if the technocratic government led by Mario Monti 
in 2011-2012 (and supported by the main parties in Parliament) had the ability 
(especially thanks to the personal reputation of its members) to reduce the severity of 
the economic crisis, at the same time it reduced the possibility for a clear process of 
electoral accountability3. Since the borders between government and opposition were 
blurred and, in addition, because of the presence of a technocratic government which 
is, by definition, above the parties, Italian voters had few possibilities to put into 
motion the mechanism of electoral accountability. Perhaps the only option in the hands 
of the electorate was to vote for ”something new”, in other words, someone who was 
not involved into the previous quasi-Grand Coalition government. That ”someone” 
was the comedian Beppe Grillo, and that ”something” was his newly created political 
party Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Stars Movement). Therefore, the interplay between 
these three international or domestic factors was the main detonator of the political 
crisis that hit Italy in 2013, when the level of electoral volatility broke the record set in 
1994 (see Figure 1) and the largest party in terms of absolute votes (25.6%) was Beppe 
Grillo’s new party, yet further proof of the extreme personalization of the Italian 
political landscape. 
It is, perhaps, too early to evaluate how ”critical” the election of February 2013 
was. At this point we can only register the signs of a third deep dealignment that has 
taken place at the electoral level. Its effects in the parliamentary arena are ongoing 
and much, in particular the emergence of a new realignment, will depend on the 
decisions regarding the new electoral system that the parties are obliged to approve 
after the Constitutional court’s ruling that certain elements of the current electoral law 
1 Stefano BARTOLINI, Roberto D’ALIMONTE, ”Majoritarian Miracles and the Question of 
Party System Change”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. XXXIV, no. 1, 1998, pp. 293-311.
2 Takis S. PAPPAS, ”Embattled Democracy: Legitimation Crisis, Party System Change, and 
the Rise of Political Extremis in Greece”, paper presented at the workshop on ”Political Change 
in the PIIGS”, European University Institute, Fiesole, June 11-12, 2013.
3 Gianfranco PASQUINO, Marco VALBRUZZI, ”Non-partisan Governments Italian-Style. 
Decision-making and Accountability”, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. XVII, no. 5, 2012, 
pp. 612-629; Duncan McDONNELL, Marco VALBRUZZI, ”Defining and Classifying Technocrat-
led and Technocratic Governments”, paper prepared for the panel ”Technocrats, Caretakers 
and Parties in the Long European Crisis”, European Union Studies Association Conference, 
Baltimore, 9-11, 2013.
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(implemented in 2006) are illegal. What I can say here is that, whether or not a ”new” 
party system is in the making, the political landscape in Italy remains amorphous and 
at the mercy of too many personal parties with life spans that too closely follow those 
of their leaders. Thus far, the third party system has proved little more than a Chimera 
or simply the wishful thinking of some politicians and scholars. Once again, in Italy 
something dies and something else, with indistinct features and an uncertain future, 
emerge. In the next section I will delineate the main traits of the former, whereas I will 
let at the concluding remarks the temptation to describe the evolution of the party 
system after the political earthquake of 2013. 
Neither Polarized nor Fragmented, but Destructured:
The Italian Bipolarism
In the classic US two-party system model, the transformation of a party system 
can be easily identified by the occurrence of a critical election. However, this does not 
mean that the US has changed its party system, just that the balance of power between 
the two largest parties is significantly changed. Indeed, the party system of the United 
States has remained unchanged for more than two centuries. The concept of a ”critical 
election” is useful for a temporal, longitudinal analysis of the party system in a given 
country, which is why I have used it here. But, and importantly, a critical election 
cannot tell us anything about the nature or type of party system that it eventually 
creates. As the US system demonstrates, ad abundantiam, a party system might remain 
the same even after a watershed general election. Hence, it is clear that in order to 
evaluate if a party system has changed, we need a typology of party systems. While 
the literature on this topic has always been fruitful, even in recent years, the analytical 
framework proposed by Giovanni Sartori almost forty years ago maintains all its 
validity and supremacy in this field. It is within this specific framework that Mair 
states: ”Electoral change should be seen to lead to party system change only when it 
brings about a shift from one type of party system to another”1. In this light, a critical 
election can only be interpreted as a ”game-changer” if it creates the conditions for a 
transformation ”in the inter-party relationship that both results from and affects the 
competition and cooperation between political parties”2.
We have seen in Section 3 that the Italian case, at least for the period from 1945 
up to the early 1990s, can be included in that type of party system that Sartori called 
”polarized pluralism”, in which an extreme multi-party system went hand in hand 
with a high level of ideological polarization. But now the question is: What changed 
after the critical election of 1994? 
Many political scientists have emphasized that due to the ”ideological thaw” 
triggered by the end of the Cold War, or thanks to the introduction of a mixed-
member majoritarian electoral law, the mechanics of the party system have been 
modified significantly. If the first party system had been ”blocked at the centre”, after 
the rupture of 1994 Italy soon discovered the (at that time) unexpected charm of an 
1 Peter MAIR, Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1997, p. 54.
2 Paul PENNINGS, Jan-Erik LANE, ”Introduction”, in IDEM (eds.), Comparing Party System 
Change, Routledge, London,1998, pp. 1-18.
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alternation in government. In a nutshell, the party system was no longer blocked and, 
as a result, Italy entered the club of the alternational party system. This trend is clear 
when looking at Figure 3 (see the Annex). From 1948 to 1987, the average degree of 
governmental turnover is 8.3: essentially, the composition of the cabinets after the 
election remained almost unchanged. Government changeovers involved only micro-
substitutions of small allied parties but, on the whole, the fundamental structure of 
the coalitional formula remained intact. On this point it is worth stressing that the 
discovery of government alternation in Italy has been abrupt and absolutely telling. 
None of the eleven general elections held in the forty-five years of the first party 
system (1948-1993) produced a wholesale turnover in government; quite the contrary, 
if we exclude the last legislative election of 2013, every time Italian voters have had the 
possibility to express their opinion at the polls they have regularly ousted the incumbent 
government. The shift from complete absence of alternation to its constant occurrence 
occurred impressively quickly and it can also signal the passage from a blocked party 
system (for an excessive absence of rotation in government) to a similarly/equally 
blocked party system because of an excessive occurrence of alternation, a sort of vicious 
circle in which the system rotates ineffectively around itself.
In any case, if ”polarized pluralism” is based on the centrifugal ”mechanics’ 
of inter-party competition in which, by definition, alternation in government is not 
envisioned, at the same time the format of that type of party system implies the 
existence of more than five relevant parties. From the end of WWII to the early 1990s 
the number of relevant parties in Italy has been constantly higher than five, a clear 
indicator that the system was extremely fragmented (see the Annex, Figure 4). This 
situation is coherent with the description of the polarized pluralism; what is not 
coherent, at least in light of Sartori’s analytical framework, is the rise in the number 
of relevant parties in Italy after the critical election of 1994. As Gambetta and Warner 
have rightly observed, ”while old parties were dying out new parties mushroomed”1, 
with new political actors outnumbering the old ones. This argument holds true even 
when taking into account a measure of fragmentation of the party system as the 
”effective number of political parties” (see Figure 4). 
The other side of this (fragmented) picture is revealed in the concentration of 
votes for the two largest parties at the polls. As shown by Figure 5 (see the Annex), 
the electoral strength of the two largest parties has dropped from an average of 38% 
in the first party system to an average of 28% in the second republican phase. It is 
worth underscoring that this downward trend has been counterbalanced, at the 
parliamentary level, by the majoritarian effect (either implicit or explicit) produced 
by the electoral systems approved in 1993 and in 2005. For instance, thanks to the 
bonus-adjusted PR electoral system, in 2013 the two largest parties at the polls (M5S 
and PD: jointly 51%) attracted (and gained, especially the PD) 64.4% of the seats. 
In sum, since 1994 the Italian party system has experienced an increasing trend of 
fragmentation and, to some extent, atomization: more parties – often minor and short-
lived organizations. For this reason the second party system has been described as a 
1 Diego GAMBETTA, Steven WARNER, ”Italy: Lofty Ambitions and Unintended Conse-
quences”, in Josep COLOMER (ed.), Handbook of Electoral System Choice, Palgrave, London, 
2004, p. 246.
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strange case of ”fragmented bipolarism”1 in which the extreme number of parties has 
been constrained by, and encapsulated within, two alternative all-encompassing pre-
electoral coalitions characterized by a significant degree of ideological heterogeneity2. 
This pattern can be observed in Figure 6 (see the Annex), which shows the average 
number of parties in the cabinet by parliamentary term. On average, the cabinets of 
the party system were made up of three parties, whereas in the subsequent phase 
there are four or more governing parties. By the same token, the ideological range of 
the cabinet has also increased remarkably in the passage towards the second phase 
of Italy’s republican history: the distance between the two parties at either end of the 
left-right extreme since 1994 is nearly three times higher than the previous period. To 
conclude on this point, after the disappearance of the established mass-based parties, 
Italian cabinets have become more fragmented, both numerically and ideologically. 
Although the prevailing type of government has changed in the passage from the 
first to the second party system, whereby since 1994 ”minimum winning coalition” 
cabinet has been the most frequent coalitional formula (see the Annex, Figure 7), the 
higher stability experienced by the cabinets has not improved their political decision-
making and effectiveness. In short, the unstable immobilism of the first republican 
phase was simply replaced by the stable immobilism of the second party system.
Thus far we have seen that, since 1994, Italy has abandoned the ”mechanics” 
of polarized pluralism but, simultaneously, and especially as a consequence of a 
poorly designed electoral reform, the ”format” of the party system has dramatically 
increased. So to speak, the mechanics describe a bipolar system, while the format 
keeps telling a story of polarization and fragmentation. In fact, it is no coincidence 
that scholars looking for an appropriate name for Italy’s emerging party system 
adopted the original label ”polarized bipolarism”3. From this viewpoint, the process 
of ”bipolarization” that started in 1994 has not brought about a parallel process of de-
polarization of the party system. Quite the opposite, and because of the enduringly 
high number of political parties, the ideological distance among the same parties has 
remained significant. Since the ideological spectrum is ”elastic”, in the sense that 
”the more parties, the more their competition tends to spread along a linear, left-
right type of space”4, even after the end of the Cold War, the ideological distance (in 
the electorate’s perception) between the parties has remained constantly high. As a 
matter of fact, the temporary reduction of polarization registered in 1994 lasted no 
more than a few years and, since 2001, the ideological distance has reached levels 
similar to those of the previous (highly ideological) phase (see the Annex, Figure 8). 
That said, the main question remains: Did the 1994 general election bring about 
a change in the type of party system? Yes and no. Yes, if we consider that many 
1 E.g. Roberto D’ALIMONTE, ”Italy: A Case of Fragmented Bipolarism”, in Michael 
GALLAGHER, Paul MITCHELL (eds.), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 253-276; Alessandro CHIARAMONTE, ”Dal bipolarismo frammentato 
al bipolarismo limitato? Evoluzione del sistema partitico italiano”, in Roberto D’ALIMONTE, 
Alessandro CHIARAMONTE (eds.), Proporzionale se vi pare. Le elezioni politiche del 2008, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2010, pp. 203-228.
2 Roberto D’ALIMONTE, ”Italy: A Case...cit.”.
3 Giovanni SABBATUCCI, Il trasformismo come sistema, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2003; 
Giuseppe IERACI, Governments and Parties in Italy. Parliamentary Debates, Investiture Votes and 
Policy Positions (1994-2006), Troubador Publishing, Leicester, 2008.
4 Giovanni SARTORI, Parties and Party Systems…cit., p. 304.
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facets of the old polarized pluralism were lost on the journey towards a different 
”pattern of democracy”, that is, towards a less consensual and more majoritarian 
form of democracy. Nevertheless, this transformation, which has taken the shape of 
an institutional transition, has remained incomplete: it stalled at the junction between 
the unexpected collapse of the old polarized pluralism and the emergence of a hybrid 
polarized and fragmented bipolarism. What is more, the very existence of this new 
type of party system, one that was not even contemplated in Giovanni Sartori’s 
original typology, bears witnesses to the enduring state of flux and uncertainty of the 
Italian system. For this reason, I prefer to describe the second party system as a case 
of ”destructured bipolarism”, that is, a type of system not yet fully institutionalized 
which can take, from time to time and from election to election, different shapes and 
formats. This type of party system shows significant oscillation in the number of 
relevant parties, as occurred before and after the 2008 election, which has witnessed 
a drastic, though temporary, reduction of the parliamentary fragmentation. The 
same holds true also for the irregular trend of the ideological polarization: after the 
small decline in the early 1990s, it has grown significantly since 2001, with the minor 
exception of the 2008 general election. It might be argued (though this goes beyond 
the scope of this article) that the nature of the polarization is inherently different in 
the two distinct phase of Italian history (before and after 1994). If, for instance, the 
polarization of the first party system was drivenby purely ideological reasons, in the 
subsequent period it turns out to be driven by the ”strategic” incentives provided by 
the ”populist bipolarism” present in Italy1. It is this specific ”dynamic of polarization” 
– a relatively new phenomenon that may also be identified, inter alia, in Greece2 and 
Venezuela3 – that explains the coexistence in Italy of a bipolar pattern of inter-party 
competition and the increasing (and self-reinforcing) rise of polarization.
To recapitulate and conclude, the critical election that occurred in Italy in 1994 
brought about a significant, albeit ambiguous, change to its type of party system. In 
their definitions of the new system, many scholars have alternatively emphasized 
either the rise of party fragmentation or the permanence of a high level of polarization. 
Nevertheless, neither ”fragmented bipolarism” nor ”polarized pluralism” are able to 
adequately capture the actual mechanics of the second party system. On the contrary, 
the defining feature that has characterized Italy since 1994 is its constant and enduring 
level of destructuration; a level that outstrips all the other West-European countries. 
A simple indicator of party system destructuration shows quite well this specific 
condition of the Italian system (see the Annex, Figure 9).
In light of all these specifications, I would define the party system born in Italy 
at the mid-1990s as one of ”destructured bipolarism”. It is a type of party system 
that cannot be easily compared to those of the other advanced and well functioning 
democracies. But, above all, it is a system bound to remain in a state of perennial 
fluidity, until new actors find the strength and grasp the opportunity to (re)build new 
and more resilient structures, both at the electoral and at the institutional level. 
1 Gianfranco PASQUINO, ”The 2013 Elections and the Italian Political System”, paper 
presented at the conference ”2013 Italian Elections – Italian Politics at the Crossroads?”, 
Birmingham, 17 January 2014.
2 Takis S. PAPPAS, ”Why Greece Failed”, Journal of Democracy, vol. XXIV, no. 2, 2013, 
pp. 31-45.
3 Javier CORRALES, ”In Search of a Theory of Polarization. Lessons from Venezuela, 
1999-2005”, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, vol. 79, 2005, pp. 105-118.
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In Lieu of a Conclusion: 
Toward a Third Party System?
After twenty years of inconclusive institutional transition and the introduction 
of unstable bipolarism, the Italian party system faced another critical election. In 
February 2013, many of the organizations and actors of the second party system were 
wiped out by a new, and unpredicted, electoral upheaval. Many of the political actors 
that played a crucial role in the previous phase(s) were defeated and new parties, 
prompted by one of the severest economic crises to have occurred in Italy since the 
end of WWII, have entered Parliament for the first time. It is still too early to fully 
evaluate the consequences of the latest national election, but it is not too early to 
say that in the winter 2013 we saw further proof of the weak institutionalization 
of the Italian political parties; indeed, their ephemeral organizations have not been 
able to effectively cope with a changing electoral environment. If one – following 
Huntington1– can say that a party is ”institutionalized” when it reaches a certain 
degree of adaptability (among other factors that I do not take into consideration 
here), then recent Italian history offers up very few examples of these. Their dominant 
trait – with only minor exceptions – is the inability to evolve and adapt to different 
institutional and electoral contexts. From this perspective, there is nothing new under 
the sun. The Italian political landscape appears bound to stay in a state of constant, if 
not declining, destructuration. In such a case, the eventual third party system would 
be the simple continuation of the previous system in disguise. 
But the current situation is much more complicated than that, largely because of 
the nature of the new parties that made their appearance in 2013. In particular, the 
flamboyant emergence of Beppe Grillo’s M5S as the largest political party at the ballot 
boxes cannot be simply treated, or discounted, as the usual arrival of yet another personal 
party in a country where personalization has put aside complex and long-lasting political 
organizations. The MS5 party is something else2, and its consequences for the evolution 
of the party system might be much more profound. In a way, Grillo’s movement is not 
only a new personal party; it is, more importantly, a new polarization-carrier. Its main 
goal – as its founder and leader recognizes – is ”to change the system”3, where ”the 
system” refers to the classic representative (parliamentary) democracy. In this sense the 
M5S can be defined as a ”relationally anti-system party” which, by definition, 
“adopts ’isolationist’ strategies, and tends to build a ’separate’ pole of the system 
and to refuse to enter coalitions (at the national level), and resorts to outbidding 
propaganda tactics, systematically opposing and discrediting some founding 
values of the regime, on which all other parties agree”4.
1 Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, 
New Haven & London, 1968, pp. 13-17.
2 Fabio BORDIGNON, Luigi CECCARINI, ”Five Stars and a Cricket. Beppe Grillo Shakes 
ItalianPolitics”, South European Society and Politics, 2013, online; Piergiorgio CORBETTA, 
Elisabetta GUALMINI (eds.), Il partito di Grillo, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2013.
3 Beppe GRILLO, ”Non abbiamo fretta”, online at www.beppegrillo.it/2013/05/non_
abbiamo_fretta.html.
4 Giovanni CAPOCCIA, ”Anti-System Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment”, Party Politics, 
vol. 14, no. 1, 2002, p. 25.
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These are precisely the strategies adopted by the M5S to date, whose entry in 
Parliament has already incentivized the reproduction of a centrifugal competition 
between parties and, accordingly, the birth of new splinter groups eager to chase 
M5S’s issues and voters. 
Furthermore, the second relevant characteristic of Grillo’s party is its distinctability 
to attract voters from very different social groups or classes. In today’s Italy, the party 
is the best example of a truly catch-all (people’s) party, a movement able to ʼcatch” 
votes from across society: from white and blue-collar workers, public employees and 
private entrepreneurs, students and retirees. In sum, the M5S is, at least at this stage 
of its organizational evolution, a catch-all anti-system party; and this combination of 
sociological and ideological factors may significantly affect the party system. More 
precisely, the anti-system stance of the M5S has pushed the party into an ʼ isolated” pole 
in which there is no incentive to unite with other pro-system parties; simultaneously, 
the sociological composition of its electorate has spread the party along the entire 
political spectrum, from (extreme) left to (extreme) right. As a consequence, Grillo’s 
party is not isolated in a (single) pole but, rather, circles the pro-system actors (see the 
Annex, Figure 10).
At this point, it is also worth stressing that, since the 2013 legislative election 
brought to the fore a new political cleavage that separates those parties that have 
accepted the decisions taken by the European Union from those who have criticized 
(and would reject) the incursion of EU institutions into national politics, the party 
system is currently divided along two different lines of conflict: a) the classic, 
horizontal left-right divide; and b) the new, vertical cleavage pro- or anti-EU. In such a 
multidimensional political context, the current Letta government, which includes the 
mainstream pro-EU actors, is an oversized coalition that occupies the metrical centre 
of the political spectrum and faces opposition from both semi-loyal and anti-system 
parties. Thus, more than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, today’s Italy offers 
all the conditions for the re-emergence of the polarized pluralism that characterized 
the first party system. After WWII, the opposition to the pro-system (governing) 
parties was bilateral, that is, isolated in two excluded poles: the Communist pole, on 
the left, and the Neo-Fascist pole, on the right. Today, the role of bilateral opposition 
to the system is carried out by a single player whose ideological and sociological 
heterogeneity allows it to act at both extremes of the political spectrum.
So, is Italy predestined to return to the old days of polarized pluralism, with 
its inevitably unstable centrist governments and the consequential impossibility of 
alternation in power that this poses? Of course, there are many signs that the eventual 
third party system might look rather like the first, especially for the cumbersome 
presence of a catch-all anti-system party that can ”hinder, or make more difficult, the 
formation of ’bipolar’ coalitions”1. We know from Marx that history repeats itself: 
first as tragedy, second as farce. Besides that, the first party system was not a tragedy 
but a necessary evil, the second was an unnecessary evil and the third might be a 
necessary virtue only if it can reverse the trend toward a complete destructuration of 
its democratic politics. To do so, a serious and farsighted feat of political engineering 
is urgently needed. Until that day comes, Italy seems destined to remain as it is: 
suspended in its transitional limbo, awaiting judgement.
1 Ibidem, p. 27.
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ANNEX
Table 1
Phases of Coalition Government in the Italian Republic, 1945-2013
Govern ment 
formula
Years Parties 
involved
Number 
of 
cabinets
Sub-phases and 
Prime Ministers
Major policy 
issues
Democratic 
instauration
1945-7 DC-PCI-
PSI-PLI-
PRI
4 Parri 1945
De Gasperi 1946
Constitutional 
setting
First party system
Centrism 1947-60 DC-PLI-
PSDI-PRI
13 Preparation: De • 
Gasperi 1947
Central period: • 
De Gasperi 
1948-53
Crisis: De • 
Gasperi 1953, 
Pella 1953, Fanfani 
1954
New stabilization: 
Scelba 1954, Segni 
1955
Final crisis: • 
Zoli 1957, Fanfani 
1958, Segni 1959, 
Tambroni 1960
Interna tional 
alliances, 
economic reforms
Centre-left 1960-75 DC-PSI-
PSDI-PRI
17 Preparation: • 
Fanfani 1960-62, 
Leone 1963
Central period: • 
Moro 1964-8
Crisis: Leone • 
1968, Rumor 
1968-70
New • 
stabilization: 
Colombo 1970
Attempts • 
to change 
the coalition: 
Andreotti 1972-3
Decline and • 
final crisis: Rumor 
1973, Moro 1974-6 
Nationalizations, 
enlargement of 
the public sector, 
social reforms
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National 
solidarity
1976-9 DC-PCI-
PSI-PSDI-
PRI-PLI
3 Preparation and • 
central period: 
Andreotti 1976-8
Crisis: Andreotti • 
1979
New stabiliza-• 
tion: Scelba 1954, 
Segni 1955
Final crisis: • 
Zoli 1957, Fanfani 
1958, Segni 1959, 
Tambroni 1960
Economic crisis, 
terrorist emer-
gency
Five-party 1980-92 DC-PSI-
PSDI-PRI-
PLI
14 Preparation: • 
Cossiga 1979-80, 
Forlani 1980
Central period: • 
Spadolini 1981-2, 
Fanfani 1982, 
Craxi 1983-6
Crisis and rene-• 
go tiation: Craxi 
1986, Fanfani 
1987, Goria 1987, 
De Mita 1988
New stabiliza-• 
tion: Andreotti 
1989-91
Final crisis: • 
Amato 1992 
Correction of the 
state intervention, 
public debts, 
inflation
I Transition
Transitional 
cabinet
1993-4 DC-PSI-
PSDI-PLI 
(PDS- 
Greens, 
PRI, LN)
1 Ciampi 1993 Economic crisis, 
institu tional 
reforms
Second Party System
Centre-right 
attempt
1994-5 FI-AN-LN-
CCD
1 Berlusconi 1994 Institu tional 
reforms, 
federalism, 
privatiza tions
Technocratic 
cabinet
1995-6 PDS-PPI-
LN (FI-
CCD-AN)
1 Dini 1995 Institu tional 
reforms
Olive tree 
coalition
1996-
2001
PDS-PPI-
Greens-
RIN
4 Prodi 1996-8, 
D’Alema 1998-99, 
Amato 2000
European 
policies, reform 
of the welfare 
state, institu tional 
reforms
Berlus-
conism I
2001-6 FI, AN, 
LN, UDC
2 Berlusconi 2001 Federalism, 
Immigra tion, 
institutional and 
electoral reforms
635
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 4 • 2013
Not a Normal Country
Centre-left 
interruption
2006-8 DS-Margh-
IdV-RC-
Greens-
Rad-Udeur
1 Prodi 2006 Economic 
reforms, 
liberaliza tion, 
institutional and 
electoral reforms
Berlus-
conism II
2008-11 PDL-LN-
MPA
1 Berlusconi 2008 Federalism, 
education reform, 
institutional 
reforms
II Transition 
Transitional 
technocratic 
cabinet
2011-13 PDL-PD-
UDC
1 Monti 2011 Economic 
crisis, austerity 
measures, 
electoral reform
Third Party System 
Centrist-
mainstream 
coalition
2013- PD-PDL-
UDC-SC
1 Letta 2013 Economic crisis, 
institutional and 
electoral reforms
Source: the period 1945-1993 is re-adapted from Maurizio COTTA, Luca VERZICHELLI, 
”Italy. From ʼConstrained’ Coalitions to Alternating Governments?”, in Wolfgang C. MÜLLER, 
Kaare STRØM (eds.), Coalition Governments…cit., pp. 432-497.
Figure 1
Electoral Volatility in Italy, 1948-2013
Note: author’s own calculation based on Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility1.
1 Mogens N. PEDERSEN, ”The Dynamics of European Party Systems. Changing Patterns 
of Electoral Volatility”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. VII, no. 1, 1979, pp. 1-26.
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Figure 2
Average Age of the Italian Party System, 1946-2013
Figure 3
Governmental Turnover in Italy by Legislative Election and 
Parliamentary Term, 1948-2013
Note: turnover in government is calculated as the sum of the gains of all ”winning” parties 
(those that increased their weight in the cabinet) and the losses of all ”losing” parties (those 
that had their weight in the cabinet reduced), divided by two. Its range goes from 0 (absence of 
turnover) to 100 (wholesale turnover, or alternation)1. 
1 For more details, Marco VALBRUZZI, ”Misurare l’alternanza, la sua pratica e la sua 
mancanza”, in Gianfranco PASQUINO, Marco VALBRUZZI (eds.), Il potere dell’alternanza. Teorie 
e ricerche sui cambi di governo, Bononia University Press, Bologna, 2011, pp. 303-334.
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Figure 4
Number of Relevant and Effective Parties in Italy, 1948-2013
Note: author’s own calculation based on Laakso and Taagepera’s index1.
Figure 5
Size of the Top-2 Parties and Largest Party, 1946-2013
1 Markku LAAKSO, Rein TAAGEPERA, ”Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with 
Application to West Europe”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1979, pp. 3-27.
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Figure 6
Average Number of Relevant Parties in Government and Cabinet Ideological 
Range by Parliamentary Term, 1948-2013
Source: for the data on the cabinet ideological range, see Andrea VOLKENS, Pola 
LEHMANN, Nicolas MERZ, Sven REGEL, Annika WERNER, The Manifesto Data Collection. 
Manifesto Project (MRG, CMP, MARPOR), 2013; data for the XIV and XVII parliamentary terms 
are not available.
Figure7
Types of Government in Italy, 1946-2013
Note: the types of government are weighted by time (days in office).
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Figure 8
Main Italian Political Parties’ Ideological Positioning on the Left-right Scale 
(According to Voters’ Perceptions), 1968-2013
1968 
             PCIPSIUP                              PSU                                PRI     DC                               PLI      MSI  
            (1.2) (1.7)(3.3)                                      (5.1)  (5.5)                (7.2) (7.8)         
     (1 LEFT)                      (10 RIGHT) 
                        1972 
                  PCIPSIUP        PSI              PSDI            PRI     DC           PLI      MSI 
  (1.7)(2.1)                 (3.3)             (4.5)                   (5.2)  (5.6)         (6.5)               (8.3) 
                    1985 
PCIPSI                                        PRI   DC     PLI      MSI 
             (2.1)(3.9)                                         (5.7)  (6.1) (6.5)                  (8.7)   
            1990 
              PCIPSI   VERDI             PSDI  PRIDCPLI      LNMSI   
  (2.4)                         (4)    (4.6)                  (5.3)  (5.6)      (6.4)  (6.6)(7.1)    (8.8) 
    1994 
RC          PDS                   PPI             LN   FI    AN 
             (2.9)           (3.4)                                                (5.9)                           (7.4) (7.5)  (8.7)        
                          1996 
             RC         PDS                                                     PPI            CCD/CDU  LNFI           AN 
  (2.5)       (3.1)                          (5.6)           (6.8) (7)                 (8.3)        (9.2)        
                          2001 
                     RC         CI           DS                VERDI DEM IDV UDEUR              CCD/CDU                         LN    FI   AN   FT 
  (1.7)     (2.1)      (2.9)                (4)    (4.5)  (4.7) (4.8)                    (6.3)                           (7.8) (8)  (8.6)  (9) 
                          2006 
RC                  DS            VERDI MARGH                                    UDCLN    FI   AN    
   (1.6) (2.8)              (3.4) (3.6)                                    (6.3)                                  (8) (8.1) (8.6)  
                          2008 
                              SA                             PD   IDV                                UDC                                                    LN  PDL   Right  
               (2.3)                           (4)  (4.4)                              (5.5)  (7.9) (7.9) (8.3) 
                          2013 
                              SEL      PD                                   M5S              UDC   SC                                                    LN     PDL 
  (2.3)    (2.8)                                 (4.6)             (5.5)(5.5)                                                 (8.1)  (8.4) 
     (1 LEFT)    (10 RIGHT) 
Source: author’s own calculation based on ITANES’s datasets (www.itanes.org). Note: 
black dots identify the median voter’s position. 
Figure 9
Destructuration of the West-European Party Systems, 1945-2013 (%)
Note: Party system destructuration has been calculated as the average of: a) the vote share 
of new parties at the ballot box; b) the seat share of parties not previously elected for the national 
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Parliament (e.g., M5S in 2013 Italian election); c) the seat share of parties not previously elected 
for the national Parliament and immediately included in the cabinet (e.g., Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia, in 1994). Its theoretical range goes from 0 (minimum destructuration) to 100 (maximum 
destructuration). 
Figure 10
Multidimensional Configuration of the Italian Party System after 
the 2013 Legislative Election
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